




Genericity in event semantics:  
A look at Yoruba generic sentences1 
 
Taofeeq Adebayo – Tulane University 
 
Abstract. I propose a theory of genericity that is grounded in neo-Davidsonian event semantics 
(Parsons 1990, 2000; Higginbotham, 2000; etc.). I distinguish broadly between three types of 
individual: kind individuals, generic individuals and concrete individuals. A distinction is made 
between particular events and generic events on the one hand; and between kind-level states, 
individual-level states, stage-level states and generic states on the other hand.  I propose that only 
generic individuals require the presence of the Gen operator and that kind and concrete 
individuals are existentially closed with the logical form of kind individual involving a type-
shifting operation. Also, I propose that generic events and generic states contain the generic 
predicate ‘gen (e)’ which turns concrete eventualities into generic ones and that the other types 
of eventuality also have their respective predicates that distinguish them from one another. When 
this framework is applied to genericity in Yoruba, it is shown first that Kimian states 
(Maienborn, 2007) in Yoruba have an E-position that the generic predicate (the imperfective) 
máa-ń targets (contrary to expectation), and second that in some constructions máa-ń is best 




My major concern in this paper is to propose a theory of genericity based on neo-Davidsonian 
event semantics (advanced in such works as Parsons (1990, 2000)), and to account for generic 
sentences in Yoruba. The main motivation for this proposal is based on the distinctions in (1).  
 
(1) a. Dogs bark.                                 [(generic dogs) (bark generically)] 
b. Dogs are friendly.                                        [(generic dogs) (are friendly) 
c. John smokes a lot.                 [(an individual John) (smokes generically)]  
d. It rains at night in Lagos.  (some event of raining occurs generically at night in Lagos) 
 
According to Carlson (1989), generic sentences express regularities. Both entities (individuals) 
and eventualities (syntactically realized as VPs and their adjunctions) can be regular or generic in 
a generic sentence (where generic sentences are taken to include habituals and reference to kind). 
Generic entities and eventualities can occur together as in (1a) and independently as in (1b-d).  
Assuming that the distinctions made in (1) are accurate, this paper argues for two sources of 
genericity in the syntax which can both be combined in a single clause as well as function 
independently as shown in (1). I argue that a proper understanding of genericity requires a 
distinction between generic, kind and concrete individuals and between generic and non-generic 
eventualities. As a result, we can distinguish between entity-driven genericity and eventuality-
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driven genericity. This distinction is close to Krifka et al’s. (1995) distinction between 
characterizing statements and reference to kind but differs in a number of ways that become clear 
below. Languages differ in what sorts of NPs and predicates can be generic based on the 
configuration of the syntax. However, there are a number of cross-linguistic generalizations that 
can be made on the semantics of generic individuals and eventualities. For example, we can 
make a pre-theoretical assumption that all languages have generic individuals and eventualities 
as well as other kinds of individuals and eventualities, which are considered below.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I lay out a theoretical framework for genericity 
in event semantics in Sections 2 and 3. I then apply this to Yoruba generic sentences in Sections 
4 and 5. I identify some preliminary advantages of the framework in section 6. The two most 
important conclusions in this section are that Kimian states in Yoruba do have an E-position and 
that the Operator Gen is pronounced in some constructions in the language. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Three ontological types of individuals  
 
The many theories of NP/DP referencing in generic sentences include: uniform kind-referencing 
(Carlson, 1977 and others), neo-Carlsonian Approach (Chierchia, 1998 and others), the 
Ambiguity Hypothesis (Gerstner-Link and Krifka, 1993 and others), theory of incorporation 
(Farkas and de Swart, 2003 and others). For an elaborate description of the development of 
theories on this topic, see Mari et al. (2013). But works on NP/DP referencing that are directly 
relevant to the ontological distinction made below are those that address the distinction between 
specific and nonspecific NPs. Discussions of this distinction can be found in Baker (1973), 
Hawkins (1978) Fodor and Sag (1982) and Enç (1991). A common distinction between the two 
relates to the scope of the NP. NPs with narrow scope are generally taken to be nonspecific (a 
student in (2c)) while those with wider scope are taken to be specific (a student in (2b)).  
 
(2) a. Every teacher in that school beat a student yesterday. 
b. A student was such that all the teachers in that school beat him yesterday. 
c. For each of the teachers in that school, there was a student they beat yesterday. 
 
Another distinction that plays a major role in the ontology developed below can be found in 
Krifka et al. (1995). According to Mari et al. (2013:6), Carlson (i.e. 1977) was the first to 
propose an ontology for kind, distinguishing it from ‘normal individuals’ like John. This 
ontology is recognized and advanced in Krifka et al. (1995). The NP ‘dinosaurs’ in ‘Dinosaurs 
are extinct’ refers to the kind individual, ‘dinosaur kind’. Krifka et al. (1995) also make a 
distinction between specific and non-specific NPs but this distinction was different from the 
traditional distinction that is based on the difference between (2b) and (2c). For them, a specific 
NP refers to a particular individual while a nonspecific NP does not refer to any specific 
individual in particular. In the following examples (Krifka et al. 1995:16), ‘a dog’ (3a) refers to a 
specific dog while ‘a dog’ (3b) refers to dogs in general. 
 
(3) a. A dog is barking.   b. A dog barks.  
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The result of the above discussion is that there is a conflict of terminology regarding what is 
a specific NP and what is not. Recognizing this conflict, Krifka et al. (1995:15) put their own 
classification on a purely pre-theoretical level. In what follows, I attempt to resolve this conflict 
in the categorization that I propose. Now let us consider what we have established up to this 
point. First, we have established, based on Carlson (1977), that there is such a thing as a kind 
individual distinct from ordinary individual. Making this distinction also makes us realize the 
existence of normal or ordinary individual, which is often referred to in the literature as specific 
individual (e.g. Krifka et al., 1995:15 and Pelletier, 2010:11). Two kinds of individuals are thus 
sufficiently recognized in the literature: kind individuals (e.g. dinosaurs in the example above) 
and specific individuals (a dog in (3a)).  A general distinction that Carlson (1977:442) makes 
between kind individual (or kind-level individual) and specific (or normal) individual is that the 
former can be here and there while the latter is confined to a location at a given time. Using this 
diagnostic, we can posit that the individuals referred to in (2b), (2c) and (3a) are normal 
individuals (in the sense that we have been using the term ‘normal’), while dinosaur refers to 
kind individual. However, the reference that the NP dogs in (3b) make is not as quite 
determinable using the kind-normal distinction above. It does not refer to a dog located at a 
particular location and time, and it does not refer to a kind the same way that dinosaurs does. 
This, therefore, forces us to recognize another kind of individual that is in a medial position 
between kind individual and normal individual: an individual which is not specific and is abstract 
like kind individual, but which is different from kind individual in that it accumulates its 
properties from generalizations about instances of a kind. I call this ‘generic individual’ and 
assume that it is this abstract individual that NPs like a dog in (3b) refer to. The idea of a generic 
individual is not unheard of. A similar idea can be found in the philosophy literature. Fine 
(1983), for instance, argued in defense of a long-standing idea about the concept of arbitrary 
objects which are distinguished from individual objects.  
Let us now go back to the conflict of terminology identified above. In all of the examples 
above where we have identified specific or normal individuals, the common characteristic of all 
the NPs is that they refer to concrete instances which are located in time and space. For this 
reason and to escape the terminological problem associated with the specific-non-specific 
distinction, I will refer to this kind of individual as ‘concrete individual’ which can, then, be 
subdivided into different categories to account for the differences among (2b), (2c) and (3a). 
Consider the following examples of the three kinds of ontological individuals established so far: 
 
(4) a. Dogs are everywhere. [kind indiv.]     b. A dog barks. [generic indiv.]	
c. A dog is barking. [concrete indiv.]      d. Everyone brought a dog each.[concrete indiv.] 
e. The dog is barking.  [concrete indiv.]  f. Jack barks at night. [concrete indiv.] 
 
We can now examine each of these individuals one at a time. I start with concrete 
individuals. These individuals have nuances that make them distinct from one another. The 
difference we pointed out between (2b), (2c) and (3b) suggests strongly that we must be able to 
distinguish different kinds of concrete individuals in our system. At this point, we can recognize 
at least four types: specific, non-specific, definite and proper. This is illustrated as follows: 
 
(5) a. A dog is barking.   [concrete specific individual] 
b. Everyone brought a dog each. [concrete non-specific individual] 
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c. The dog is barking.   [concrete definite individual] 
d. Jack barks at night.  [concrete proper individual] 
 
I assume that these types have the same general logical form which can be modified variously to 
account for the minor differences. For example, (5a), will have the following logical form, 
leaving out events for now: ∃x [dog(x) ∧ barks(x)]. We can appeal to scope position to 
distinguish (5b) from (5a). For (5c), we can make use of the iota notation. For (5d), we might 
consider ‘Jack’ a referring expression (as in [barks(j)]) or a predicate bound by existential 
closure as in (5a-c). What seems to be common to each is binding by existential closure.  
Next, I consider the kind individual. According to the general assumptions of Carlson (1977), 
kind individuals are abstract individuals that may have actual instantiations. Since they are not 
concrete, they lack the kind of regular existential closure used for concrete individuals. There are 
broadly two ways in which we can implement the logical form of kind individuals. We can treat 
them as proper names with direct kind predication as in (6b); we can also assume that they 
involve variables with existential closure which are type-shifted into the kind individual. The 
latter way can be implemented in the various ways shown below (6c-e).  
 
(6) a. Dinosaurs are extinct.       b.	extinct	(dinosaurs)	
c. ∃x [dinosaurk (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Krifka et al 1995) 
d. ∃x [↑dinosaur (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Link 1995:382)  
e. ∃x [∪∩dinosaur (x) ∧ extinct (x)] (after Chierchia 1998) 
 
Another way to implement (6) is to assume that there is a Gen operator, which binds a type-
shifted variable that refers to the kind. I assume here that kind individual, as well as concrete 
individual, does not need the Gen operator and that it is only the generic individual that the Gen 
operator binds. This assumption is based on the following argument. I assume here that an 
inherent part of the concrete individual and the kind individual is that they are existentially 
identified in terms of ontology. For example, when we say a dog is outside, we can paraphrase 
this as ‘there is something in the world namely a dog that is outside’; likewise, when we say dogs 
are widespread, we can paraphrase this as ‘there is some kind in the world namely the kind dog 
that is widespread’; it will be awkward, however, to paraphrase a statement like dogs bark as 
‘there are some individuals in the world namely some dogs that bark’. Generic individuals are 
not existentially closed at least not in the sense that concrete and kind individuals are. 
One of the major assumptions of this paper is that there is a third kind of individual that is 
neither concrete nor is a kind individual. I identified this as the generic individual. Like kind 
individual, it is an abstract individual, but it gets its own properties from generalizations about 
instances of a kind. I assume here that since they are based on rough generalizations about 
instances of a kind individual, they are bound by the unpronounced Gen operator as in the 




Davidsonian events semantics (Davidson, 1967) assumes that verbs of action and change in 
natural language have a hidden event argument now commonly referred to as the E-position (see 
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Higginbotham, 1985:555). This idea has been extended in the neo-Davidsonian tradition 
(represented in such work as Parsons 1990 and 2000; Landman, 2000; Higginbotham, 2000, etc.) 
which assumes that all predicates, including statives, have the E-position. While this has been 
widely accepted in the literature, scholars such as Maienborne (e.g. Maienborn, 2007 and 2011) 
and Katz (e.g. Katz, 2000) have continued to argue for a Davidsonian view that only eventive 
predicates (Katz, 2000) and ‘Davidonian states’ like sit and sleep (Maienborn, 2007) have an E-
position. Maienborn (2007), for example, demonstrates that a kind of state she describes as 
Kimian state, ontologically and linguistically, defers from eventive predicates and Davidsonian 
states in a number of ways, arguing that they lack the E-position.  
For reasons of space, I do not address this distinction between eventives and Kimian states or 
what Moltmann (2013) calls ‘abstract states’ here but see Section 6 for the consequences of the 
proposal here for Kimian states. In the theoretical framework that I lay out shortly, I assume that 
all predicates have an E-position. I also assume (following Parsons, 1990) that there are three 
sorts of things that predicates generally encode: events, states, and processes, which I 
collectively refer to as 'eventualities' (Bach, 1986).   For the purpose of this paper, my focus is on 
events and states. First, I propose that there are different kinds of states and events with regard to 
their interaction with individuals, their duration and number of instances across time and space. 
For example, states such is extinct, only apply to kind individuals, a state such as is hungry is 
shorter in duration than a state like is intelligent, while a particular event such as smoked last 
night has one instance whereas an event such as smokes after dinner has multiple instances. It is 




The general tradition in event semantics is to think of events in concrete terms. Events are 
located in space and time. We can have multiple events such as e1, e2, etc.; we can also have 
subevent (e’) commonly proposed for such constructions as resultatives and causative-
inchoatives. What is not common is to think of events as having uncountable instances. But there 
are some events which cannot be given the description of a particular event and which seem to 
have multiple instances that are not countable. Consider the following:  
 
(7) a. Mary smoked at the party. 		b.	∃e [smoking (e) ˄ ag (e, Mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)] 
 
(8) a. Mary smokes after dinner.   b. * ∃e [smoking (e) ˄ ag (e, Mary) ˄ after_diner (e)] 
 
While the interpretation in (7b) is accurate for (7a), ignoring tense and salience, (8b) does not 
give an accurate interpretation of (8a) for the reason that (8b) suggests that there is a concrete 
event which took place at a certain time but which does not take place with some regularity. This 
is against the meaning of (8a). Although (8a) can be given the standard analysis in the following 
way: GEN [x,s;] (x = Mary & smoke (x. s); after.dinner (s)) (Krifka, 1995:238), the question is: 
can event semantics handle the regularity that is associated with some events such as the one in 
(8a)? To answer this question, I first propose that there are two types of events. These are 
particular/concrete events and generic events.  This particular distinction can be found in the 
work of Montague (Montague, 1969) as reported in Pianesi and Achille (2013). According to 
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them, Montague distinguished between generic events (e.g. sun rises) and particular events (e.g. 
sun rose yesterday). For him, generic events are a kind of property and particular events are 
instantiations of generic events. Montague’s theory is metaphysical however, and its major 
assumption is that particular events are derived from generic events. In the system that I advocate 
in this paper, generic events are derived from particular events with an addition of a predicate. 
My own distinction between generic and particular/concrete events, therefore, is purely linguistic 
and ontological rather than broadly metaphysical. Let us start by observing the following: 
 
(9)       There are ontologically two kinds of events in natural language: 
            a. Particular/concrete events with countable instances     
            b. Generic events with uncountable instances 
 
I define particular events as a kind of event that is located in a specific time and location and 
does not express any form of regularity. I also assume that they have single instances. Of course, 
they can be distributive as in John buttered three loafs of bread, and have subevents, but they 
generally lack the property of having uncountable instances. A generic event, on the other hand, 
is an event which expresses some regularity. A generic event is true only when there is some 
regularity involved and it is not the case that it has definite instances. For instance, in the event in 
the expression Africans drink palm wine, it is hard to think of how many instances this event 
drink has. To formalize this regularity in the neo-Davidsonian framework, I propose that all 
events have an additional predicate that is either concrete (10a) or generic (10b). 
 
(10) a. [[concrete]]v,et = λPλe [P (e) ˄ con (e)]   b. [[generic]]v,et = λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)] 
 
When (10b) is applied to a standard neo-Davidsonian event, it turns such an event into one that 
occurs with some regularity and allows for counterfactuals, whereas when (10a) is applied to an 
event, it indicates that the event has a concrete instance. The distinction between (7a) and (8a) 
can now be handled as in (11a&b) respectively. 
 
(11) a. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ con (e)]] (∃e [smoke (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)]) = 
       ∃e [smoke (e) ˄ con (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ at_the_party (e)] 
b. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] (∃e [smoke (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ after_dinner (e)]) = 
       ∃e [smoke (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, mary) ˄ after_dinner (e)] 
 
This derivation defers from the standard treatment of events only with the introduction of the 
generic/concrete predicate. Introducing a new predicate is not uncommon in the event semantics 
literature. Parson (1990:28) for example, uses Cul and Hold to account for tense and aspect; 
gen/con is no less a predicate accounting for a functional category. Summarily, what 
distinguishes concrete events from generic events is the generic/concrete predicate. 
 
3.2  States 
 
Four distinct types of states can be identified in terms of duration, number of instances and the 
kind of individual that can be their argument. Let us start with (12): 
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(12) Four ontological kinds of states can be identified: 
a. kind-level state  b. stage-level state 
c. individual-level state d. generic state 
 
Kind-level states are a kind of state that only takes a kind individual as a theme. For example, is 
extinct is a state that can only be true of the kind the dinosaur. I borrow Carlson’s (1977) 
terminology of individual-stage-level predicates and distinguish between stage-level states and 
individual-level states. A stage-level state is one which applies to stages of an individual; this is 
tantamount to what one might regard as temporary state. Is hungry is an example of stage-level 
states. An individual-level state applies to each and every stage of an individual. This is what one 
might consider a permanent state. An example of this is is brave. Generic state is a kind of state 
that comes with some regularity and has multiple instances that are not definite. An example of 
this is is always hungry. This is neither a pure stage-level state nor an individual-level state. It is 
a state that is scattered among the stages of an individual and does not apply to each and every 
stage of such individual. I assume that the mechanism in (10) is applicable to the categories in 
(12) and use the predicate kind-l (s) for kind-level states, stage-l (s) for stage-level states and 
ind-l (s) for individual-level states. But for the sake of space, these predicates, and the ‘con (e)’ 
predicate are not indicated in the notations in subsequent sections. The predicate ‘gen (s)’ for 
generic state and ‘gen (e)’, however, are indicated, since they are the focus of the paper. The 
following examples illustrate the four types of state identified above:  
 
(13) a. Dinosaurs are extinct     
b. ∃s [being_extinct (s) ˄ kind-l (s) ˄ th (s, ↑dinosaurs)]  kind-level state 
 
(14) a. John is hungry. 
b. ∃s [being_hungry (s) ˄ stage-l (s) ˄  th (s, john)]  stage-level 
 
(15) a. John is clever.  
b. ∃s [being_clever (s) ˄ ind-l (s) ˄ th (s, john)]   individual-level 
 
(16) a. John is always hungry. 
b. ∃s [being_hungry (s) ˄  gen (s) ˄ th (s, john)]   generic 
 
The reader might find it unusual that the adverb of quantification always in (16a) has been 
reduced to a predicate in (16b), given that it is often treated as an operator. In the next section, I 
show that Yoruba treats both generic state and event the same, so that (16a) is expressed with the 
same grammatical means that generic events are expressed with.  
 
4 Generic eventualities in Yoruba 
 
In this section, I provide an account of how the various types of eventualities I have identified 
above are realized in Yoruba, with a focus on generic events and states. Let us start with non-
generic eventualities. These eventualities have the common characteristic that they are realized 
in the syntax with simple predication. No additional particle or marker is needed to express them. 
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Generic events and states, on the other hand, are explicitly marked in the language.  A generic 
eventuality is generally marked with the imperfective marker máa-ń. This marker has the 
function of taking particular events and turning them to events with indefinite instances. This is 
exactly what the gen predicate proposed above does. Let us give the logical form of (17a) as in 
(17b) and the denotation of máa-ń as in (18). (19& 20) show application of (18) to (17b). 
 
(17) a. Bọ́lá    jẹ ewé 
    Bọ́lá    eat leaf 
    ‘Bọ́lá ate leaves.’ 
  b. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, leaf)] 
 
(18) [[máa-ń]] = [[generic]]v,et= [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] 
 
(19) Bọ́lá máa-ń jẹ ewé (‘Bọ́lá eats leaves (habitually’)) 
 
(20) a. [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] (∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, b) ˄ th (e, leaf)]) 
b. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, leaf)] 
 
While (17b) states that there is a particular one-instance event of eating leaves that has Bọ́lá as 
an agent, (20b) states that there is an indefinite multiple-instance event of eating leaves that has 
Bọ́lá as an agent. The implication of (18), therefore, is that the category of events that was 
identified as generic event in the previous section not only has an ontological support but also a 
linguistic support in Yoruba. Next, let us consider the case of generic state. 
Linguistic support for the category of generic state is not readily available in English since 
what corresponds to máa-ń is not phonologically available. But this support is found in Yoruba. 
Generic states, just like generic events, are constructed from particular states (stage-level states 
in most cases) by using máa-ń (the generic predicate). Consider the following: 
 
(21) a. Bọ́lá    wà ní    ilé        ọtí 
    Bọ́lá   exist in    house   alcohol 
    ‘Bọ́lá is/was at the bar.’ 
 b. Bọ́lá       máa-ń     wà     ní     ilé        ọtí 
     Bọ́lá      gen         exist   in     house    alcohol 
     ‘Bọ́lá is/was at the bar in multiple indefinite instances (habitually).’ 
 c. ∃s [being-in-the-bar (s) ˄  gen (s) ˄ th (s, bọ́lá)] 
 
(21c) which is the logical form of (21b) states that there is a generic state of being at the bar 
whose theme is bọ́lá. Note that the generic state in (21b) can also be expressed in English as 
‘Bọ́lá is always at the bar’. But this cannot give the accurate information that is expressed in this 
sentence, because (21b) does not contain anything that corresponds to adverb of quantification. It 
only states that there are multiple occasions of Bọ́lá being at the bar, and does not specify 
whether this is usually, seldom or always. To do that, prepositional constructions that are similar 
to English adverb of quantification (e.g. ní ẹ̀ẹ̀kọ̀ọ̀kan ‘sometimes/seldom’, ní ọ̀pọ̀ ìgbà 
‘often/usually/ in most cases’, etc.) will have to be used. The consequent intuition, therefore, is 
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that máa-ń is a true generic predicate that modifies an eventuality variable to give it the property 
of having multiple instances of unspecified number.2 
 
5 Concrete, generic and kind individuals in Yoruba 
 
There are only two forms of NP in Yoruba that make reference to kind individuals and generic 
individuals. These are what I refer to in this paper as Bare NPs (BNPs) like ajá ‘dog’, ewúrẹ́ 
‘goat’, etc., and Plural NPs (PNPs) such as àwọn ajá ‘dogs’, àwọn ewúrẹ́ ‘goats’, etc. These two 
forms can also make reference to the different kinds of concrete individuals identified in Section 
2. The starting point then is to assume that these two forms are ambiguous between reference to 
kind, generic and concrete individuals. What determines which individuals they refer to is the 
type of eventuality in which they are serving as argument and the nature of the second argument 
in the eventuality. Let us start with the kind individual. The two forms are interpreted as kind 
individuals when they serve as a theme of a kind-level state (henceforth, K-state) as shown in 
(22ai). But only the BNP yields kind interpretation with individual-level sate (henceforth, I-state) 
as in (22bi); PNP is odd in this context. Also, when both forms are a theme of an I-state with an 
experiencer (see footnote 2), kind interpretation is obtained as in (22ci). Generic interpretation of 
BNP is also obtained in deontic modality even when the eventuality is a particular event as 
shown in (22di). In this latter case, it is assumed that the deontic modality turns a concrete event 
into a state (property) which can be predicated of a kind as shown in (22dii). This property can 
then be inherited by members of the kind in appropriate worlds. 
 
(22) a. BNP/PNP as theme of K-state → kind individual 
     i. (Awọn) Ajá wà káàkiri 
        (PL) dog be everywhere 
         ‘Dogs are everywhere.’ 
     ii. ∃s [being-everywhere (s) ˄ th (s, ↑dog)] 
b.  BNP as theme of I-state → kind individual 
      i. Ewúrẹ́ ní ẹ̀jẹ̀ 
          goat have blood 
          ‘Goats have blood.’ 






2	 In some constructions, the generic predicate reduces to a clitic í, whose surface representation is determined by 
phonological processes not addressed here. 
(i) a. Bọ́lá    kìí  mu ọtí    b. Gbígbó ni ajáá    gbó 
    Bọ́lá    NEG.gen drink beer               barking FOC dog.gen    bark 
      ‘Bọ́lá doesn’t drink beer (habitually).’           ‘BARKING is what dogs do (generically/habitually)’       
c. Ewúré kìí  gbó                          d. Ajá       níí  gbó 
      goat NEG.gen bark                            dog      FOC.gen bark 
      ‘Goats don’t  bark.’                                      ‘DOGS bark generically/ habitually.' 
56
© 2018 by Taofeeq Adebayo
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 48-64
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
	
	
c. BNP/PNP as theme of K-state with an experiencer3 → kind individual 
      i. Bọ́lá fẹ́ràn (àwọn) ọmọdé 
          Bọ́lá like (PL) child 
          ‘Bọ́lá loves children.’ 
      ii. ∃s [loving (s) ˄ exp (s, bọ́lá) ˄ th (s, ↑child)] 
d. BNP as an agent of particular event in deontic modality → kind individual 
      i. Ayékòótọ́ lè kọrin 
          parrot  can sing 
          ‘A parrot can sing’ 
      ii.  λw ∃e [singing (e) ˄ ∃s [able-to-be-agent-of-‘e’ (s) ˄ th (s, ↑parrot) ˄ in (s, w)]]    
 
Let us next consider the concrete individual. The two forms are interpreted as concrete 
individuals when they are an agent or a theme of a particular event (henceforth, P-event) as in 
(23ai). They are interpreted as concrete individuals when they are an agent (23bi) or a theme 
(23ci) of a generic event (henceforth, G-event) with a concrete individual argument. 
 
(23) a. BNP/PNP as an agent or theme of P-event → concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá jẹ egungun 
          (PL) dog eat bone 
         ‘A/the dog/ the dogs ate a piece (some pieces) of bone.’ 
      ii. ∃e [eating (e) ˄ ag (e, dog) ˄ th (e, bone)] 
b. BNP/PNP as an agent of G-event with concrete individual theme→ concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá maa-n lé Bọ́lá 
          (PL) dog gen chase Bọ́lá 
           ‘A certain dog or some certain dogs chase Bọ́lá in indefinite occasions’ 
      ii. ∃e [chasing (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, dog) ˄ th (e, bọ́lá)] 
c. BNP/PNP as a theme of G-event with concrete individual agent → concrete individual 
      i. Bọ́lá maa-n lé  (àwọn) ajá   
          Bọ́lá  gen chase (PL) dog 
          ‘Bọ́lá chases a certain dog or some certain dogs in indefinite occasions’ 
      ii. ∃e [chasing (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, bọ́lá) ˄ th (e, dog)] 
 
Concrete individual interpretation is also obtained when BNPs and PNPs serve as the theme 
of a stage-level state (henceforth, S-state) (24ai) and as the experiencer of an I-state with 
concrete individual theme (24bi). They are also interpreted as concrete individuals when they are 
an experiencer in a generic state (henceforth, G-state) that has a concrete individual argument 
(24ci) or when they are a theme of a G-state with a concrete individual experiencer (24di).  
 
(24) a. BNP/PNP as a theme of S-state → concrete individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá dákẹ́ 
          (PL) dog be.silent 
																																								 																				
3	I use the term ‘experiencer’ to refer to the individual who is aware of a stimulus (following Hilpert, 2014:27).  The 
term is used here to distinguish between the arguments of verbs like love. For example, in Jane loves dogs, Jane is 
the experiencer and dogs is the theme. I use the notation ‘exp’ to signify the term ‘experiencer’ in logical forms.		
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          ‘The dog(s) are silent or the dog(s) became silent.’ 
      ii. ∃s [being-silent (s) ˄ th (s, dog)] 
b. BNP/PNP as an experiencer of S-state with concrete individual theme → concrete 
individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá fẹ́ràn mi 
          (PL) dog like 1SG 
          ‘The dog(s) like me.’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ exp (s, dog) ˄ th (s, me)] 
c. BNP/PNP as an experiencer of G-state with concrete individual theme → concrete 
individual 
      i. (Àwọn) ajá máa-ń fẹ́ràn mi 
          (PL) dog gen like 1SG 
          ‘A dog/ some dogs like me in indefinite number of occasions’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, dog) ˄ th (s, me)] 
d. BNP/PNP as a theme of G-state with concrete individual experiencer → concrete 
individual 
      i. Mo máa-ń fẹ́ràn (àwọn) ajá pupa 
          1SG gen like (PL) dog red 
          ‘I like red dog(s) in indefinite number of occasions’ 
      ii. ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, I) ˄ th (s, dog)] 
 
A generalization that can be observed with regard to the interpretation of BNPs and PNPs as 
concrete individuals is that they require an aspect of a proposition to be concrete or to be located 
in time and/or place. That is, they require that either the eventuality is particular or that there be a 
second argument that is particular (concrete). For instance, we see in (23) and (24), that concrete-
individual interpretation is tied to P-events (23ai), S-state (24ai), and the requirement that the 
second argument has a concrete-individual interpretation (23bi, 23ci, 24bi, 24ci and 24di). It 
should be noted as well that there are different types of concrete individual in (23) and (24). For 
instance, ajá ‘dog’ and egungun bone in (23ai) refer to concrete specific individuals, ajá ‘dog’ 
and its plural form àwọn ajá ‘dogs’ in (23bi, 23ci, 24ci and 24di) refer to non-specific individual, 
ajá ‘dog’ and àwọn ajá ‘dogs’ in (24ai) and (24bi) refer to concrete definite individual, while 
Bọ́lá in (23bi) refers to a concrete proper individual.  
Let us start by observing that, generally, only BNPs are naturally interpreted as generic 
individual; PNPs either yield existential interpretation or are generally odd. One peculiar 
characteristic of interpreting BNPs as generic individuals is that they occur in generic 
eventualities. However, it should be noted that things are not as quite straightforward with this 
observation, as there are some of these eventualities that superficially appear as generic but are 
best analyzed as non-generic. The starting point then is to make the distinction between true 
generic eventualities in this regard and superficial generic eventualities and then see how the 
BNPs figure. Examples of true generic eventualities that yield generic interpretation of BNPs is 
given in (25). (25ai) shows how BNPs are interpreted as generic in G-event with no theme while 
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(25) a. BNP as an agent of G-event with no theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń gbó  
         dog gen bark 
         ‘Dogs bark.’ 
       ii. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃e [barking (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, x)]] 
 
 b. BNP as an agent of G-event with concrete non-specific theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń jẹ egungun  
         dog gen eat bone 
         ‘Dogs eat bones.’ 
      ii. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃e [eating (e) ˄ gen (e) ˄ ag (e, x) ˄ th (e, bone)]]  
 
What (25) basically shows is that when BNPs occur in generic eventualities, they are interpreted 
generically. The source of their generic interpretation can then be located in those generic 
eventualities. However, note that (25aii) and (25bii) defers from the standard Gen approach in 
two respects: first, the verbal predicate is interpreted as event and this event is taken to be 
generic; second, the generic interpretation of the NP is said to be tied to the genericity of the 
eventuality. As such, (25aii) states that generally for dogs there is some generic event of barking 
that they do, while (25bii) states that generally for dogs there is some generic event of eating 
concrete (non-specific individual) bones that they do. Next, consider the superficial generic 
eventualities that also yield generic interpretation for BNPs: 
 
(26) a. BNP as an experiencer of superficial G-state with kind theme → generic individual 
      i. Ajá máa-ń fẹ́ràn egungun  
         dog gen like bone 
         ‘Dogs likes bone.’ 
b. BNP as an experiencer of superficial G-state with concrete non-specific theme →    
       generic individual 
      i. Ewúrẹ́ máa-ń ní ìwo 
         goat gen have horn 
         ‘Goats have horn’ 
c. BNP as a theme of superficial G-state → generic individual 
      i. Mààlû máa-ń tóbi 
         cow gen be.big 
         ‘Cows are big.’ 
 
We can go ahead and give (26ai, bi and ci) the same kind of treatment as before, so that their 
logical forms are as in (27a-c) respectively. But this will be counter-intuitive as argued below. 
 
(27) a. Gen x [dog (x) → ∃s [liking (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, bone)]] 
b. Gen x [goat (x) → ∃s [having (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, horn)]] 
c. Gen x [cow (x) → ∃s [being-big (s) ˄ gen (s) ˄ th (s, x)]] 
 
(27) states, wrongly, that some generic individuals undergo an I-state in an indefinite number 
of occasion. For instance, (27c) states that generally for cows, there is some state of being big 
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that they experience in an indefinite number of occasions. This is contrary to the meaning of 
(26ci) which only says that there is an indefinite number of occasions where a given cow is big. 
To resolve this mismatch, we have to do away with the generic predicate in (27) and treat the 
eventualities therein as I-states rather than G-states constructed from I-states. The implication of 
this then is that the source of generic interpretation for the BNPs in the examples in (26) cannot 
be located within the eventualities but must be from a different source in those sentences.  
The most available intuition is that, if the generic interpretation of the BNPs cannot be due to 
the eventualities in those sentences, then it must be due to the imperfective marker máa-ń, which 
has been argued above to be the generic predicate. The examples in (26) are different. Máa-ń 
does not turn the eventualities in those sentences to generic eventualities, but instead ensures that 
the BNPs in those sentences are interpreted generically. If this observation is in the right 
direction, then máa-ń does not serve as the generic predicate in those sentences, but as an 
operator that binds the variables supplied by the BNPs. From this viewpoint, máa-ń in (26), 
therefore, has a semantics that is very close to or the same as that given to the generic operator, 
Gen. We can then posit that máa-ń has the two denotations shown below:  
 
(28) a. [[máa-ń]] = [[generic]]v, et= [λPλe [P (e) ˄ gen (e)]] 
b. [[máa-ń]] = [[Gen]]e, t= λPλQ Gen x [P (x) → ∃e/s [Q(e/s) ˄ ag/th (e/s, x) ]]  
 
Let us illustrate (28b) with the example in (26bi) given as (29b) below. Recall that BNPs that 
serve as a theme/experiencer of an I-state are interpreted as kind individuals (see 22b). Without 
the imperfective marker máa-ń, the BNP in (26bi) is interpreted as a kind individual as in (29a). 
Consider the following: 
 
(29) a. Ewúrẹ́  ní  ìwo = ∃s [having-horn (s) ˄ exp (s, ↑goat)] = kind individual 
b. Ewúrẹ́  máa-ń ní ìwo = 
c.  Máa-ńx [Ewúrẹ́x  ní  ìwo] = 
d. Genx [Ewúrẹ́x  ní  ìwo] = 
e. Gen x [ ewúrẹ́ (x) → ∃s [ níní (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, ìwo)]] = 
f. Gen x [ goat (x) → ∃s [ having (s) ˄ exp (s, x) ˄ th (s, horn)]] 
 
(29b-f) demonstrates the compositional derivation for máa-ń as an operator. (29c) demonstrates 
that máa-ń specifically targets a variable that is supplied by the BNP. The other examples in (26) 
has to be given the same logical form in (29f) where there is no generic predicate, but rather a 
generic operator that is phonologically available.    
If (28b) is correct and the derivation for máa-ń in (29b-f) is accurate, then it follows that the 
so-called silent operator Gen, may not be silent in some languages and some contexts after all. 
The discussion above has shown that, while it is silent in some constructions as in the examples 
in (25) where its presence is due to the nature of the eventuality, it has a pronounced counterpart 
in other constructions, as demonstrated by the examples in (26). The implication, therefore, is 
that Yoruba provides an empirical support for the so-called Gen operator. 
A generalization that can be taken from the discussion so far is that BNPs are naturally 
interpreted as abstract individual (kind or generic) while PNPs naturally have an existential 
interpretation of concrete individuals. It was shown that PNPs are possible as kind individuals 
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but this is rather far restricted. The fact that PNPs are generally odd as generic individuals also 
suggest that PNPs are naturally existential and that their interpretation as kind individual is rather 
due to a type-shifting operation whose source can be located in the eventuality. Existential 
interpretation of BNPs can also be explained away by a type-shifting operation that is occasioned 
by the eventuality. This type-shifting operation might be reminiscent of Carson’s theory, but I 
am not committed to that theory. I have only employed this conceptualization ad hoc to put the 
general distribution of these two forms of Yoruba NPs in proper perspective.      
 
6 Some preliminary advantages  
 
The most important advantage of the theoretical framework proposed in this paper is the freedom 
it allows for one to look at genericity in a language like Yoruba that has not been robustly 
researched in this area. I was able to account for genericity in Yoruba without having to commit 
to any specific theory of genericity whose limitations could have hindered exploratory pursuits. 
The framework also has cross-linguistic applicability. For languages whose generic sentences 
have not been researched before, the framework provides a general adaptable analytic guideline 
that makes use of ontological distinctions in individuals and eventualities which may be 
distinguished in different ways cross-linguistically.  
The framework is also able to account for not only subject arguments but also object 
arguments in terms of generic-kind-existential interpretation. Most theories of genericity 
concentrate on subject arguments (see Mari et al., 2013:2), but it seems that we need to be able to 
account for object arguments as well. The ability of this framework to account for both subject 
and object arguments means we can account for grammatically conditioned genericity in Yoruba 
as found in the syntactic account of Ajiboye (2005). As we saw above, sometimes, generic-kind-
existential interpretation of an NP may be conditioned by the nature of the second argument. 
Using events semantics makes it possible to account for this fact. 
This framework also avoids recourse to pragmatics, as is often the case in the standard Gen 
approach. For instance, (1d) repeated in (30a) will be given a logical form like that in (30b). 
According to this framework, the logical form of (30a) can be restated as in (30c). 
 
(30) a. It rains at night in Lagos. 
b. Gen s [s is a situation appropriate for raining in Lagos → it rains] 
c. ∃e [raining (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ at (e, night) ∧ in (e, lagos)] 
 
(30c) does not specify more than what is present compositionally in (30a). Since there is no 
generic individual in (30a), there is no need for the Gen operator. This is consistent with the 
assumption of the framework that only generic individuals are bound by the Gen operator.  
Another significance of this framework is in the fact that it makes some predictions that may 
have bearing on current issues in event semantics. Maienborn’s theory of statives and copula + 
adjectives (Maienborn, 2004, 2005 and 2007) states that statives and copula + adjective are 
Kimian states that lack Davidsonian event argument. If this assumption were true for Yoruba, 
then there would be nothing we can refer to as generic state. But as the discussion above has 
shown there is indeed a generic state in the language. Let us consider this here again: 
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(31) a. Ade   bínú   b. Adé máa-ń bínú  
    Ade   be.angry                 Ade gen be.angry 
    ‘Ade was angry.’       ‘Ade is generically angry.’  
 
First, note that (31b) is not available in English: the approximation ‘Ade is usually angry’ does 
not accurately represent the meaning of sentences like (31b) in that it does not contain any 
prepositional phrase that are equivalent to English adverb of quantification. (31b) only states that 
Ade is angry in multiple number of occasions that is not definite just as ‘Mary smokes’ indicates 
that Mary smokes in an indefinite number of occasions.  According to Maienborn’s theory, (31b) 
should not be possible since bínú ‘be.angry’ would lack a Davidsonian event argument. Our 
generic predicate máa-ń would, therefore, have no event argument to turn to generic. My 
argument here is that since Yoruba treats both regular events and Kimian states (like the one in 
(31)) the same by using máa-ń (the generic predicate) to turn them from particular eventualities 
to generic eventualities, generic states have an ontological as well as an empirical basis. This 
suggests that there may be languages where Kimian states can be shown to have a hidden event 
argument. If my assumptions are correct, Yoruba is one of those languages. This framework also 
led to the ambitious suggestion that máa-ń is an overt pronunciation of the Gen operator. 
Finally, the framework is able to handle issues relating to focus and ambiguity. Both 
individuals and eventualities can be put in focus. The mechanism developed here can be 
implemented variously to account for each case. (32a) and (33a), both repeated from (i)b and (i)d 
respectively in Footnote 2, demonstrate respectively how Yoruba grammatically puts generic 
eventualities and individuals in focus. Both sentences express the same idea; the difference is in 
what is put in focus. This difference is reflected in the logical forms in (32b) and (33b).  
 
(32) a. Gbígbó ni ajáá  gbó 
     barking FOC dog.gen bark 
     ‘BARKING is what dogs do (generically/habitually)’  
  b. ∃e [barking (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ Gen x [dog (x) → ag (e, x)]] 
 
(33) a. Ajá  níí  gbó 
    dog  FOC.gen bark 
    ‘DOGS bark generically/ It is dogs that bark generically or habitually.’ 
  b. Gen x [dog (x) ∧ ∃e [barking (e) ∧ gen (e) → ag (e, x)]]) 
 
We can illustrate how the framework handles ambiguity with the popular example ‘Typhoons 
arise in this part of the Pacific’. The two standard readings of this sentence are shown below: 
 
(34) a. Gen x [typhoon (x) → ∃e [arising (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ ag (e, x) ∧ in (e, this_part      
of_the_pacific]] 
b. ∃x [this_part of_the_pacific (x) ∧ ∃e [arising (e) ∧ gen (e) ∧ ∃y [typhoon (y) ∧ ag (e,       
y)] ∧ in (e, x)]]) 
 
While (34a) contains both a generic individual and generic eventuality, (34b) contains a generic 
eventuality and concrete individual. (34a) states that the generic individual ‘typhoons’ is such 
that it generically occurs in this part of the Pacific, while (34b) states that this part of the Pacific 
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is such that some generic event of arising whose agent is concrete individual ‘typhoons’ occurs 
in it. Since (34b) does not contain a generic individual, Gen is not necessary. This also supports 




The overarching claim of this paper has been that in the kind of sentences that we regard as 
generic, both individuals and eventualities can have generic interpretations. Perhaps the most 
notable proposal in this part of the system is that there is a generic individual which is distinct 
from kind individual and concrete (normal) individual. The distinction made between particular 
(concrete) and generic eventualities also appears to be conceptually and empirically supported. It 
was shown that Yoruba makes this clear distinction and that this distinction determines how 
noun phrases in the language are interpreted. Application of this framework to Yoruba generic 
sentences touches on two major issues related to current theories of genericity and event 
semantics. First, it was suggested that there is evidence in Yoruba that Kimian states do have the 
E-position which the generic predicate máa-ń applies to. Second, it was shown that the most 
intuitive treatment of máa-ń in certain constructions in the language is to give it the semantics of 
the Gen operator, thereby suggesting that Gen is not silent in all contexts in Yoruba after all. 
Adopting the framework also provides the opportunity to avoid recourse to pragmatics and an 
avenue to account for both subject and object arguments of generic sentences. The general 
prediction is that the different kinds of individuals and eventualities identified here are present 
cross-linguistically and that languages may have their own ways of expressing them. Further 
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